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THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO 
INCORPORATE O’CONNOR’S DANGEROUSNESS 
REQUIREMENT INTO THE STANDARDS UTILIZED IN 






Civil commitment is defined as “[a] commitment of a person 
who is ill, incompetent, drug-addicted, or the like, as contrasted with 
a criminal sentence.”1  The definition attempts to capture the main 
distinction between the two types of confinements: it points out that 
at the basis of civil commitment lays one’s status, while at the basis 
of criminal sentence lays one’s action.  The question then becomes 
whether the status alone is enough to civilly confine an individual.  
Although the Supreme Court already answered this question in the 
negative,2 the practical reality is not in sync with the law.  It becomes 
noteworthy then that sometimes dictionaries capture not only the 
meaning of the term, but also the practical reality behind it. 
Mentally ill individuals have been secluded from the rest of 
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1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116-17 (4th pocket ed. 2011). 
2 See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (providing that “a State cannot 
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving 
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or 
friends”). 
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the society for centuries.3  At first they were placed in jails and shel-
ters for the poor, then in asylums for the lunatics, and later into psy-
chiatric institutions.4  Prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
in O’Connor v. Donaldson,5 the “need for treatment” standard gov-
erned all civil commitments.6  Under this standard, the presence of 
mental illness and a doctor’s recommendation for continuous treat-
ment were sufficient to institutionalize an individual for an indefinite 
term.7  Courts and states paid little attention, if any, to the commit-
ment process during this time.8  The era of the “need for treatment” 
requirement signified the utmost decision-making power ever vested 
in psychiatrists.9  Unsurprisingly, when there is no check on this 
power, abuse can follow.10  To correct this injustice, in 1975, the Su-
preme Court announced that only a successful satisfaction of a new 
dual requirement of mental illness and dangerousness could produce 
a civil commitment.11  It was no longer enough to have only a doc-
 
3 See Megan Testa & Sara West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7(10) 
PSYCHIATRY 30, 31-32 (2010). 
4 Id. at 32. 
5 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
6 See, e.g., William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappro-
priate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. 
REV. 259, 314 (2010) (explaining that “[p]rior to O’Connor v. Donaldson and its progeny, 
both the law and clinical practice required psychiatrists to assess only mental illness and a 
need for treatment”). 
7 Id. at 261. 
8 See Paul S. Appelbaum, A History of Civil Commitment and Related Reforms in the 
United States: Lessons for Today, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 13, 14 (2006) (explaining that 
“what existed during this time was an informal system that evolved without statutory author-
ity, criteria, or procedures, and that placed commitment decisions entirely in the hands of . . . 
the medical profession, without any role for the state or the courts”). 
9 Id. 
10 See, e.g., Testa, supra note 3, at 32 (describing the first documented challenge to a 
questionable involuntary confinement that was brought by Mrs. Mary Packard.  She was 
committed to a psychiatric facility in Illinois in 1860, pursuant to her husband’s request.  Mr. 
Packard was convinced that his wife was possessed by a bad spirit.  His conviction stemmed 
from the fact that Mrs. Packard was attempting to explore religious beliefs other than Pres-
byterian.  As a result, Mrs. Packard was diagnosed with “moral insanity” and spent three 
years in the institution.  Upon release, Mary Packard learned that she lost all her parental and 
property rights.); see also John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and 
Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 377, 379-80 (1998) (describing the case of one Hinchman who 
claimed that his “relatives had conspired to commit him to an asylum for the purpose of de-
priving him of his property”).  The court in Hinchman affirmed “the common law right of 
family and friends to restrain the non-dangerous insane for their own benefit.”  Id. at 380. 
11 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 (providing that “there is . . . no constitutional basis for con-
fining [mentally ill] . . . if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom”). 
2
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tor’s recommendation to confine an individual.12  From now on, the 
status of mentally ill had to be accompanied by dangerousness to ei-
ther self or others.13  More importantly, it became the judges’ role to 
examine psychiatrists’ findings to determine whether or not someone 
is to be committed.14 
Millions of people have been institutionalized since 
O’Connor.15  Undoubtedly, many commitments were justified; how-
ever, some were wrongful.  Those patients who challenged their con-
finements, seeking the imposition of liability for their wrongful civil 
commitments on committing mental health professionals acting on 
behalf of the State, faced very pro-commitment legal standards that 
were almost impossible to satisfy.16 
Currently, to decide whether liability for wrongful civil com-
mitment should be imposed on psychiatrists acting on behalf of the 
state, courts look at anything but the O’Connor requirements.17  
 
12 See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrel, 407 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Neb. 1975) (acknowledging that 
“[t]o permit involuntary commitment upon a finding of ‘mental illness’ and the need for 
treatment alone would be tantamount to condoning the State's commitment of persons 
deemed socially undesirable for the purpose of indoctrination or conforming the individual's 
beliefs to the beliefs of the State”). 
13 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576. 
14 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 262-63 (explaining that after O’Connor, courts became 
“the decision-makers as to whether patients have satisfied the civil commitment criteria”). 
15 Id. at 261 (stating that “[i]n the United States, psychiatric hospitals involuntarily con-
fine more than one million individuals per year”). 
16 See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Wherefore Art Thou Romeo: Revitalizing Youngberg's 
Protection of Liberty for the Civilly Committed, 54 B.C. L. REV. 535, 558-59 (2013): 
Despite its drawbacks, however, the . . . [gross negligence] standard has 
become the best shield for plaintiffs against arbitrary government deci-
sion making.  An examination of Lewis and its progeny demonstrates 
that the Supreme Court’s adoption of the shocks-the-conscience standard 
for substantive due process violations has imposed a nearly insurmount-
able obstacle to holding government officials responsible for their abuses 
of power. 
Id.  See also Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdica-
tion under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 646 (1992). 
17 Compare Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1063 (2d Cir. 1995) (deciding 
the issue of imposition of liability on state psychiatrists by reviewing whether the commit-
ting mental health professional’s decision to confine was made on the basis that is “substan-
tially below the standards generally accepted in the medical community”), and Bolmer v. 
Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 312 F.3d 1145, 
1147 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); with Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (imposing liability on state psychiatrists only if their decision to commit an indi-
vidual, under the circumstances, shocks-the-conscience); Obado v. UMDNJ, Behavioral 
Health Ctr., 524 F. App'x 812, 815 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); and James v. Grand Lake Mental 
Health Ctr., Inc., No. 97-5157, 1998 WL 664315, at *1, *7 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998) (same). 
3
Walker: O'Connor's Dangerous Requirement
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
152 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
Some federal courts inquire whether the committing mental health 
professional’s decision to confine was “substantially below the stand-
ards generally accepted in the medical community;”18 others ask 
whether the decision to commit shocked the conscience.19  There is 
not a single federal court that would investigate whether the constitu-
tional bases, announced by the Supreme Court in O’Connor, were 
satisfied. 
A simple syllogism can lend a hand in clarifying an important 
point.  When an individual challenges his or her wrongful commit-
ment, he or she alleges that the legal grounds for such commitment 
were not present; the individual was either not mentally ill, not dan-
gerous, or both.  It is logical then that when an individual challenges 
his or her confinement and seeks damages, the courts should inquire 
whether the person was both mentally ill and dangerous.  Leaving 
aside the issue of qualified immunity, if one of the requirements is 
absent, the committing psychiatrist should be liable.  However, under 
the present standards, federal courts examine the state actors’ conduct 
without paying any regard to the constitutional requirement of dan-
gerousness announced in O’Connor.20  The failure of the federal 
courts to incorporate the O’Connor dangerousness requirement into 
their existing legal standards leads to numerous intolerable depriva-
tions of liberty without any repercussion. 
In 2010, the National Council on Disability, in its report to 
President Obama, stated that “[p]eople with psychiatric disabilities 
are routinely deprived of their rights in a way no other disability 
group has been.”21  This statement is the best testament demonstrat-
ing that American jurisprudence has yet to afford the mentally ill the 
level of protections that due process of law requires.  These protec-
tions should not be any less stringent only because the word “civil” 
precedes the word “commitment” and because the population affect-
ed is comprised of individuals touched by mental disease. 
This Comment will provide a historic overview of the devel-
opment of the presently existing legal standards utilized in challenges 
 
18 See Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063; Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 143; Jensen, 312 F.3d at 1147. 
19 See Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; Obado, 524 F. App'x at 815; James, 1998 WL 664315, at 
*7. 
20 See Benn, 371 F.3d 165; Bolmer, 594 F.3d 134; Jensen, 312 F.3d 1145; Rodriguez, 72 
F.3d 1051; Obado, 524 F. App'x 812; James, 1998 WL 664315, at *1. 
21 From Privileges to Rights: People Labeled with Psychiatric Disabilities Speak for 
Themselves, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (Jan. 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan202000. 
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to wrongful civil commitments and will suggest the need to incorpo-
rate the O’Connor requirements into them to afford truly meaningful 
constitutional protections for individuals with mental illness.  Section 
II will discuss the current constitutional requirements that govern civ-
il commitments.  It will also discuss several reasons why, in practice, 
the O’Connor requirements routinely are overlooked.  Further, it will 
instruct courts and states on what they can do to solve this problem.  
Section III will explore the development of federal case law in juris-
dictions that are split on the issue of what legal standard governs the 
imposition of liability on state psychiatrists.  Finally, it will empha-
size the need for the incorporation of the O’Connor requirements in 
presently existing legal standards. 
II.  THE COMMITMENT REQUIREMENTS OF O’CONNOR V. 
DONALDSON 
Prior to 1975, the only standard that governed civil commit-
ments was the “need for treatment.”22  Under this standard, the only 
requirements that needed to be satisfied were the presence of mental 
illness and a doctor’s certification that a patient would benefit from 
treatment.23  During this era, courts and states were not heavily in-
volved in the initial commitment process.24  All the power to commit 
rested in the sole hands of psychiatrists.25  Undoubtedly, this power 
was at times abused.26  Civil rights movement pioneers and advocates 
for the mentally ill ultimately brought to light numerous incidents of 
injustice.27  The Supreme Court responded and attempted to impose a 
 
22 See Cornwell, supra note 10, at 381-82 (noting that The National Institute of Mental 
Health's Draft Act Governing the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill “advocated the com-
mitment, on a need-for-treatment basis, of individuals who had ‘a psychiatric or other dis-
ease which substantially impairs . . . mental health’ ”) (quoting NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL 
HEALTH, DRAFT ACT GOVERNING THE HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1952)). 
23 Id. at 383 (explaining that “[t]he Mental Health Act conditioned detention on a finding 
that an individual was ‘mentally ill’ and ‘a proper subject for custody and treatment,’ defin-
ing mental illness as ‘mental disease to such extent that a person so afflicted requires care 
and treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare of others, or of the community’ ”) (quoting 
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 n.4 (1972)). 
24 See Appelbaum, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
25 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 262 (providing that “great discretion in the hands of physi-
cians: whether a person requires care and treatment for mental illness requires a clinician to 
simply exercise clinical judgment as a way to determine whether a patient satisfies the legal 
criteria for civil commitment”). 
26 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
27 See Cornwell, supra note 10, at 380 (stating that “sharp increases in the number of psy-
5
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check on physicians’ prior unrestricted power.28 
In Addington v. Texas,29 the Supreme Court proclaimed that 
“civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant depriva-
tion of liberty that requires due process protection.”30  In O’Connor, 
the Supreme Court established such constitutional protections and 
provided that only a simultaneous showing of both mental illness and 
dangerousness, either to one’s self or to others, can justify one’s lib-
erty deprivation.31  This remains the governing standard to this day. 
In O’Connor, Kenneth Donaldson, a psychiatric patient of fif-
teen years, brought an action challenging his confinement.32  He ar-
gued that the state hospital staff had “intentionally and maliciously 
deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty.”33  Although he 
was clinically diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia,34 he showed 
no signs of being dangerous, neither to himself nor to anyone else 
throughout the entire duration of his commitment.35  The Supreme 
Court declared that “a State cannot constitutionally confine without 
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in 
the freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible 
family members or friends.”36 
The practical effect of the newly announced standard was pro-
found.  In replacing the old “need for treatment” standard with the 
new, seemingly objective criteria, the Court transferred the ultimate 
decision-making power from psychiatrists to judges.37  Going for-
ward, it was no longer sufficient for a psychiatrist to merely certify 
 
chiatric hospitals, combined with public concern about erroneous commitment and the per-
sonal rights of the insane, led to the enactment of statutes in various states specifying sub-
stantive standards for commitment”). 
28 See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 563. 
29 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
30 Id. at 425. 
31 O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. 
32 Id. at 564-65. 
33 Id. at 565. 
34 Id. at 565-66. 
35 Id. at 568. 
36 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576. 
37 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 262-63: 
In theory, the imposition of a dangerousness requirement in lieu of a care 
and treatment standard limited the amount of clinical discretion psychia-
trists exercised because it provided more objective criteria to govern civ-
il commitment . . . [and that] courts become the decision-makers as to 
whether patients have satisfied the civil commitment criteria. 
Id. 
6
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that a mentally ill patient would benefit from treatment.38  Psychia-
trists were now required to support such certification by showing that 
the patient was also dangerous.39  Judges were to examine the find-
ings of the psychiatrists and to determine whether or not an individu-
al was to be confined.40 
Further, in acknowledging the need to impose a check on psy-
chiatrists’ prior unrestricted power to commit, the Supreme Court ex-
pressed its concern regarding one of the potential reasons underlying 
continuous civil commitment of patients who pose no threat to them-
selves or others.41  The Court counseled that “[m]ere public intoler-
ance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a 
person’s physical liberty.”42  Therefore, previously sufficient arbi-
trary certification of “need for treatment,” based solely on the pres-
ence of mental illness and, potentially, driven by animosity toward 
the mentally ill, could no longer survive the new constitutional limi-
tations imposed on psychiatrists’ power to confine.43 
A. The Mental Illness Requirement 
A successful showing of mental illness constitutes the first re-
quirement imposed by the Supreme Court in O’Connor on the states’ 
power to commit.44  This was once again reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Foucha v. Louisiana.45  Terry Foucha was charged with ag-
gravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.46  After he was 
found not guilty by reason of insanity,47 he was committed to a men-
tal institution for as long as psychiatrists certified that there was a ba-
sis for continuing his confinement.48 
Four years later, a panel of psychiatrists recommended a con-
ditional discharge, providing that “there had been no evidence of 
 
38 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. 
39 Id. 
40 See Appelbaum, supra note 8, at 18 (stating that “[p]hysicians and family members are 
no longer the sole decision makers.”  Now, “the judiciary is routinely involved.”). 




45 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
46 Id. at 73. 
47 Id. at 74. 
48 Id. 
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mental illness since admission.”49  At trial, one of the psychiatrists, 
appointed to a sanity commission, testified that Foucha’s prior psy-
chosis had a temporary character and that Foucha “evidenced no 
signs of psychosis or neurosis and was in ‘good shape’ mentally.”50  
Instead, the psychiatrist opined that Foucha, however, had an antiso-
cial personality, a condition that does not constitute mental illness.51  
The State of Louisiana did not contest the absence of a mental ill-
ness.52  The Supreme Court held that because one of the two constitu-
tional bases for commitment was lacking, Foucha “should not be held 
as a mentally ill person”53 and the State was “no longer entitled to 
hold him on that basis.”54 
Although the Supreme Court in Foucha failed to legally de-
fine mental illness, it engaged in crafting its definition in several of 
its other decisions.55  The following three Supreme Court cases are 
essential to understanding how modern jurisprudence views mental 
illness. 
First, in Jones v. United States,56 the Court found that any 
mental pathology that causes an individual to commit a crime, even a 
non-violent one, constitutes a mental illness.57  Michael Jones, a 
criminal defendant who was acquitted by reason of insanity for a 
misdemeanor of petit larceny, punishable by up to one year in prison, 
was automatically committed to a mental institution, pursuant to a 
District of Columbia statute.58  The statute provided for procedural 
methods of obtaining release.59  That is, whenever a judicial hearing 
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the confined is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, the individual is entitled to be re-
leased.60  Jones took advantage of these procedural safeguards twice, 
but to no avail.61  After spending more time in civil confinement than 
 
49 Id. 
50 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 78. 
53 Id. at 79. 
54 Id. at 78. 
55 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
56 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
57 Id. at 364-66. 
58 Id. at 359-60. 
59 Id. at 356-58. 
60 Id. at 357-58. 
61 Jones, 463 U.S. at 360-61. 
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his maximum prison term had he been convicted, Jones sought an un-
conditional release or re-commitment pursuant to a different state 
statute.62  The new statute would require the State to prove that Jones 
was mentally ill and dangerous by clear and convincing evidence, a 
higher standard of proof than was required under the statute pursuant 
to which he was initially committed.63 
The question became whether or not Jones was still mentally 
ill.64  The Court’s finding of a presence of a mental illness relied on 
the determination that “[a] verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that consti-
tutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of 
mental illness.”65  The Court concluded that an individual who com-
mits a criminal act is dangerous regardless of the non-violent nature 
of the committed act.66  Further, the Court found that because the 
criminal individual was acquitted, such “insanity acquittal supports 
an inference of continuing mental illness.”67  Thus, pursuant to Jones, 
mental illness is a form of abnormality that leads an individual to 
commit a criminal act even if the act is non-violent in nature.68 
Second, in its later decisions, the Supreme Court continued 
supplementing and shaping its definition of mental illness.  For in-
stance, in Kansas v. Hendricks,69 the Court found that mental illness 
is a volitional control impairment that makes it almost impossible to 
abstain from acting in a dangerous manner.70  The State of Kansas 
enacted a statute that authorized commitment of an individual suffer-
ing from a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder” that 
compels him or her to commit sexually violent acts.71  The statute de-
fined mental abnormality as a “congenital or acquired condition af-
fecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the 
person to continue sexually violent offences in a degree constituting 
 
62 Id. at 360. 
63 Id. at 358-60. 
64 Id. at 363. 
65 Id. 
66 Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-65. 
67 Id. at 366. 
68 Id. (providing that “someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit 
a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment”). 
69 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
70 Id. at 358. 
71 Id. at 350 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01). 
9
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such person a menace to the health and safety of others.”72  Kansas 
petitioned the state court to commit Leroy Hendricks, the defendant, 
who had a long history of child molestation.73  During Hendricks’s 
testimony, he acknowledged and agreed with his diagnosis of pedo-
philia, admitted to continuous sexual desires for minors, and ex-
plained that he could not suppress the urge to act on those desires 
when he “get[s] stressed out.”74  Hendricks was found to be a sexual-
ly violent predator and was committed to an institution.75 
The state court determined that pedophilia falls within the 
definition of mental abnormality.76  The Supreme Court agreed and 
found that the statute required evidence of “a present mental condi-
tion that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the per-
son is not incapacitated.”77  Thus, the Court concluded that mental 
abnormality is a “volitional impairment” that renders control of fu-
ture dangerous behavior “difficult, if not impossible.”78 
Finally, in analyzing the same Kansas statute and its applica-
tion five years later, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Crane79 altered 
and relaxed its previous definition of mental illness.  It provided that 
the State was not required to prove an individual’s absolute inability 
to control his or her own behavior.80  Rather, the State must merely 
show a “special and serious lack of ability to control behavior.”81 
Thus, pursuant to these three Supreme Court decisions, to sat-
isfy the requirement of mental illness, the State must prove several 
elements.  First, the State has to show that the individual suffers from 
a form of mental pathology.82  Second, it has to show that the mental 
abnormality presents a serious difficulty to that individual’s ability to 
control his or her deviate behavior.83  Lastly, the State must prove 
that the mental abnormality can induce the alleged mentally ill indi-
 
72 Id. at 352 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b)). 
73 Id. at 354-55. 
74 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355. 
75 Id. at 355-56. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 357. 
78 Id. at 358. 
79 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
80 Id. at 411. 
81 Id. at 412-13. 
82 See, e.g., Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-66. 
83 Crane, 534 U.S. at 413. 
10
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vidual to commit a criminal act, violent or not.84 
B. The Dangerousness Requirement 
The Supreme Court in O’Connor established that the State 
cannot confine an individual if he or she poses no danger to self or 
others.85  Following this landmark decision, numerous courts re-
viewed state statutes that authorized detention of non-dangerous pa-
tients.86  For example, in Suzuki v. Yuen,87 the Ninth Circuit struck 
down a portion of Hawaii’s civil commitment statute that authorized 
confinement of a person who was dangerous to property of any val-
ue.88  The court acknowledged that “the state’s interest in protecting 
property is not sufficiently compelling to warrant the curtailment of 
liberty brought about by involuntary commitment.”89 
Similarly, in Doremus v. Farrell,90 the court invalidated Ne-
braska’s civil commitment laws.91  The court followed the O’Connor 
requirements and held that due process required a showing of dan-
gerousness in addition to a showing of mental illness.92  It recognized 
that “[t]o permit involuntary commitment upon a finding of ‘mental 
illness’ and the need for treatment alone would be tantamount to con-
doning the State’s commitment of persons deemed socially undesira-
ble for the purpose of indoctrination or conforming the individual’s 
beliefs to the beliefs of the State.”93  Currently, all fifty states incor-
porate O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement in their commitment 
statutes.94  Although the requirement is on the books, in practice, it is 
not always adhered to. 
 
84 Id.; Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-66. 
85 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. 
86 See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. 
Court for Salt Lake Cnty., 469 F. Supp. 424, 432 (D. Utah 1979); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 
F. Supp. 439, 449-51 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus, 407 F. Supp. at 514-15; Lynch v. Baxley, 
386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne Cnty. Gen. Hosp. at Eloise, 384 F. 
Supp. 1085, 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1974); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 
(W. Va. 1974). 
87 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980). 
88 Id. at 176. 
89 Id. 
90 407 F. Supp. 509 (1975). 
91 Id. at 517. 
92 Id. at 514-15. 
93 Id. at 514. 
94 See infra notes 101-11. 
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C. Practical Reasons Why O’Connor’s Dangerousness 
Requirement Routinely Is Overlooked 
O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement is not without its 
flaws.95  These flaws constitute some reasons why the dangerousness 
requirement routinely is overlooked in practice.  Fortunately, it is 
possible to strengthen the weaknesses that surround this constitution-
al standard. 
1. Lack of Precise Definition of What 
Constitutes Danger 
The first, and likely the most significant, reason why 
O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement routinely is disregarded in 
practice is due to the vagueness of the concept of danger.96  Although 
courts and states have attempted to define what constitutes danger,97 
there is still ambiguity as to what it involves.98  Most states define 
dangerousness as a risk of harm to self or others.99  Yet, many states 
disagree about the required degree of risk needed to reach the level of 
dangerousness.100  Currently, the varying levels of dangerousness 
among the states include: substantial risk,101 clear and present 
 
95 Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 66 (1999) (discussing that although the dangerousness standard 
is currently tolerable, it is just as vague as the intolerable “need for treatment” requirement). 
96 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 264-65. 
97 See, e.g., Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 (declaring that “[t]he fact that a person has been found, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerous-
ness”); People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 772-74 nn.4-8 (Colo. 1988) (discussing the differ-
ence in states’ definitions of dangerousness). 
98 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 291-94 (explaining some of the consequences caused by 
the vagueness of the definition of danger); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assess-
ment: Forecasting Harm among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 401 
(2006) (discussing some changes in statutory commitment standards); Morris, supra note 95, 
at 70-71 (discussing the difference in defining harm and probability of its occurrence across 
the states). 
99 See infra notes 101-11. 
100 See, e.g., Stevens, 761 P.2d at 772-73 nn.4-8. 
101 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.915 (West 2013) (substantial risk); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 27-65-102 (West 2013) (substantial risk); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-495 (West 
2009) (substantial risk); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1 (West 2010) (substantial risk of imminent 
harm); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-317 (West 2008) (substantial risk); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34-B, 
§ 3801 (West 2010) (substantial risk); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (West 1989) 
(substantial risk); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.005 (West 2011) (substantial risk); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 71-908 (West 2004) (substantial risk); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122C-3 (West 2013) (rea-
sonable probability or substantial risk); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2013) (sub-
12
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threat,102 substantial physical harm,103 substantial likelihood of 
harm,104 substantial likelihood of physical harm,105 substantial likeli-
hood of serious harm,106 likelihood of serious harm,107 demonstrated 




and reasonable expectation of 
harm.110  Very few states insist on imminent threat.111  Some courts 
incorporated into their definition a requirement of a recent overt act 
 
stantial risk); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 1-103 (West 2013) (poses a substantial risk of 
immediate physical harm); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40.1-5-2 (West 2006) (substantial risk). 
102 ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4 (West 1991) (real and present threat of substantial harm); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001 (West 2011) (real and present threat); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
394.467 (West 2009) (real and present threat of substantial harm to self or substantial likeli-
hood of harm to others); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-622 (West 2010) (presents a 
danger); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7301 (West 1978) (clear and present danger of harm). 
103 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.011 (West 2012) (substantial physical harm). 
104 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 25-03.1-02 (West 2011) (substantial likelihood of harm). 
105 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 2013) (substantial likelihood of physical harm); 
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-21-61 (West 2010) (substantial likelihood of physical harm); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 2012) (substantial probability of physical harm). 
106 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-401 (West 2001) (substantial likelihood of serious harm). 
107 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37 (McKinney Supp. 2014) (likely to result in serious 
harm); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (West 2005) (likelihood of serious harm); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 71.05.150 (West 2011) (likelihood of serious harm). 
108 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1983) (demonstrated danger). 
109 D.C. CODE § 21-545 (West 2004) (likely to injury himself or others); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 229.1 (West 2012) (“likely to physically injure the person’s self or others”); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-2946 (West 2012) (likely to cause harm); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
433A.160 (West 2007) (likely to harm himself or herself or others); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 135-C:34 (West 2014) (create[s] a potentially serious likelihood of danger); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:4-27.2 (West 2010) (probable; substantial likelihood); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-
3 (West 2013) (more likely than not); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034 (West 
2013) (likely to cause serious harm); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-815 (West 2010) (likelihood 
that the person will, in the near future, suffer serious harm or cause serious harm to himself 
or others); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-3 (West 2006) (likely to cause serious harm); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 25-10-101 (West 2011) (substantial probability). 
110 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207 (West 2009) (reasonable probability); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 36-501 (West 2012) (can reasonably be expected to result in serious physical 
harm); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-119 (West 2010) (reasonably expected to engage in 
conduct placing such person or another in physical harm or in reasonable expectation of be-
ing physically harmed); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:2 (West 2013) (reasonable expectation 
that there is a substantial risk that he will inflict physical harm upon another person in the 
near future); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West 2005) (can reasonably be ex-
pected within the near future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure 
himself, herself, or another individual); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-1-1 (West 2011) (a rea-
sonable expectation that the person will inflict serious physical injury upon himself, herself 
or another person in the near future). 
111 HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.2 (West 2014) (imminently dangerous); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 53-21-126 (West 2005) (imminent threat); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-602 (West 
2012) (at serious risk). 
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of violence toward self or others, while other courts did not.112  The 
existence of these varying standards indicates that there is no agree-
ment among the states about what dangerousness entails.  However, 
because “[t]here is no requirement . . . that due process of law must 
be the same in all fifty states,”113 the states are free to provide their 
own definitions and impose additional requirements, if any.114  Un-
fortunately, individual states and their courts continuously fail to craft 
definitions that would encompass all aspects of danger. 
The absence of a clear understanding for what is deemed 
“dangerous” allows committing psychiatrists to rely on their clinical 
judgments and categorize reported symptoms to fit into the existing 
statutory definitions.115  This works to the detriment of the mentally 
ill because today’s extensive research shows that clinical judgments 
are very faulty when it comes to assessing danger.116  Typically, reli-
ance on clinical judgments results in over-predictions117 and, hence, 
wrongful confinements of non-dangerous individuals.  The truth is, 
so long as states and courts fail to provide well-crafted definitions of 
 
112 Compare Colyar, 469 F. Supp. at 434 (overt act is not required), and United States ex 
rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (same), and Project Release v. 
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1983) (same), and In re Scopes, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 
913 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1977) (same), with Suzuki, 617 F.2d at 178 (overt act is required), 
and Stamus, 414 F. Supp. at 451 (same), and Doremus, 407 F. Supp. at 514-15 (same).  See 
also Lynch, 386 F. Supp. at 391 (overt act is required); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 
1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
113 Stevens, 761 P.2d at 773. 
114 Addington, 441 U.S. at 431. 
115 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 265 (providing that “[t]he absence of . . . clarifying con-
cepts, which would limit the discretion of the civil commitment evaluators, provides an op-
portunity for psychiatrists to label individuals as dangerous when the doctors wish to confine 
people deemed to be in need of treatment”). 
116 See, e.g., Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “FIT” of Expert Predictions in 
Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17 (2003) (explaining that “[c]linical opinions 
have never received high marks for reliability”); Donald H. Stone, Confine Is Fine: Have the 
Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill Lost Their Right to Liberty? An Empirical Study to Unravel the 
Psychiatrist’s Crystal Ball, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 323, 337 (2012): 
For years, the conventional wisdom was that clinicians were rather poor 
at predicting future violence in individuals with mental disorders.  In 
general, studies showed that clinicians were right a third of the time in 
predicting whether an individual with mental illness would be involved 
in future violence.  The standard conclusion was that relying on clinical 
experience was not appreciably better than flipping a coin. 
Id. 
117 See Jones, 463 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “[c]omment-
ators and researchers have long acknowledged that even the best attempts to identify danger-
ous individuals on the basis of specified facts have been inaccurate roughly two-thirds of the 
time, almost always on the side of over-prediction”). 
14
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what danger entails, psychiatrists will continue to adopt their person-
alized definitions of danger and rely on their clinical judgments to 
commit patients who they find to be in “need of treatment” precisely 
on that basis—the basis abolished over forty years ago.118  Therefore, 
states and courts are urged to develop precise definitions of danger 
that would entail all possible aspects of this concept: level of likeli-
hood, time proximity, and required degree of harm.119 
2. Absence of Legal Requirement to Utilize 
Actuarial Methods of Assessment for Danger 
The second reason why courts repeatedly overlook 
O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement stems from the lack of a re-
quirement legally imposed on psychiatrists, which would require 
them to adhere to scientifically developed, reliable instruments for 
assessing danger.120  There is no doubt that psychiatry is not a precise 
science.121  However, it is still a science with its own knowledge, 
methods, and techniques.  Unfortunately, even though today’s psy-
chiatrists mastered their diagnostic skills, studies show that they re-
main non-proficient in their ability to assess for dangerousness.122  Ir-
respective of these findings, committing mental health professionals 
continue to disregard existing and reliable actuarial assessment tools, 
such as, “Violence Risk Appraisal Guide,” “The HCR-20,” and “The 
Classification of Violent Risk,” that can help them to ensure accurate 
conclusions.123 
 
118 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 265 (providing that “[d]octors want to treat people 
deemed to require care and treatment, and if they must certify a patient as dangerous in order 
to facilitate treatment, doctors will do so”); see also Robert I. Simon, Imminent Suicide: The 
Illusion of Short-Term Prediction, 36(3) SUICIDE AND LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 296, 
298 (2006) (discussing that the vague definition of danger can lead committing psychiatrists 
to err on the side of caution and involuntarily hospitalize patients). 
119 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 265 (calling for incorporation of “all of the components of 
a dangerousness determination: probability, imminence, and magnitude of harm to person”). 
120 Id. at 263. 
121 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 430 (explaining that “[t]he subtleties and nuances of psy-
chiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations”). 
122 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
123 See Monahan, supra note 98, at 408-13.  First, defining “actuarial (or statistical) pre-
diction” as the one that “relies on explicit rules specifying which risk factors are to be meas-
ured, how those risk factors are to be scored, and how the scores are to be mathematically 
combined to yield an objective estimate of violence risk.”  Id. at 405-06.  Second, describing 
three best-known actuarial assessment instruments.  Id. at 409-13.  One of the assessment 
tools is known as “Violence Risk Appraisal Guide,” and consists of nine categories that are 
based on twelve variables.  Id. at 409-10.  A recent study showed that only eleven percent of 
15
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Such resistance to advance psychiatrists’ professional ability 
to accurately assess for dangerousness comes at a steep price.  An in-
correct conclusion, which typically involves over-prediction,124 or la-
beling a non-dangerous mentally ill individual as dangerous, can in-
fringe upon the mentally ill individual’s constitutional right to 
liberty.125  An incorrect finding of dangerousness wrongfully triggers 
satisfaction of the O’Connor criteria, thus allowing involuntary con-
finement of a non-dangerous individual.126 
The failure of states and courts to legally require psychiatrists 
to utilize actuarial methods of assessment allows psychiatrists to con-
tinue playing an overly influential and decisive role in civil commit-
ments.127  Because psychiatrists continue to rely solely on their pro-
fessional experiences and clinical judgments, courts will have no way 
to carefully scrutinize the accuracy of the psychiatrists’ assessments.  
Thus, as a practical matter, even though the Supreme Court replaced 
the old, “need for treatment,” subjective standard with what was in-
tended to be a more objective requirement of dangerousness, psychia-
trists retain their unrestricted unilateral power to commit individuals.  
Courts and states are encouraged to explore a possibility of requiring 
mental health professionals to rely on more objective, reliable and 
empirically proven methods of assessment for dangerousness. 
 
the study participants, who scored in the first category, later committed a new violent act as 
opposed to forty-two percent of the participants in category five, and one hundred percent of 
the participants in category nine.  Id. at 410.  The second assessment tool is called “The 
HCR-20,” and consists of twenty ratings.  Monahan, supra note 98, at 410-11.  A recent 
study found that when participants’ scores were separated into five distinct categories, only 
eleven percent of the patients placed in the lowest category “were found to have committed 
or threatened a physically violent act,” as opposed to forty percent of the participants placed 
in the middle category and seventy-five percent of the participants placed in the highest cat-
egory.  Id. at 411.  Lastly, the Classification of Violent Risk places participants into “one of 
five risk classes.”  Id. at 411-13.  Only one percent of the patients in the first risk class com-
mitted a violent act within twenty weeks after their discharge from a psychiatric facility as 
compared with seventy-six percent of the participants who were placed in the highest risk 
class.  Id. at 412-13. 
124 See supra note 117. 
125 See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576 (providing that only successful showing of mental ill-
ness and dangerousness can constitutionally justify one’s civil commitment). 
126 Id. 
127 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 263 (suggesting that “psychiatrists still exercise . . . an 
inordinate amount of influence on the civil commitment process”). 
16
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3. Heavy Reliance by Judges on Psychiatrists’ 
Expert Testimony during Commitment 
Hearings 
The disregard of O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement is 
also demonstrated during commitment hearings.  Judges disregard the 
fact that one of O’Connor’s main objectives was to transfer decision-
making power from psychiatrists to judges.128  To do so, judges were 
to analyze psychiatrists’ findings of mental illness and dangerous-
ness.129  However, irrespective of what O’Connor urged courts to do, 
judges routinely make their commitment rulings by deferring to 
committing psychiatrists’ expert testimony given during hearings.130  
It is especially troubling for the judges to rely solely on clinical 
judgments given that judges are well aware of psychiatrists’ inability 
to make correct dangerousness assessments.131 
Courts are urged not to give extensive deference to commit-
ting psychiatrists’ expert opinions during commitment hearings.132  
Rather, courts should consider utilizing an independent expert testi-
mony to offer the mentally ill an opportunity to contest psychiatrists’ 
possibly erroneous findings.  Such a vehicle for questioning and test-
ing of committing psychiatrists’ assessments can help to prevent the 
commitment of those who pose no danger to themselves or others. 
4. Liability Concern and Lack Thereof 
Liability concerns can certainly influence one’s professional 
behavior.  When it comes to psychiatrists’ liability concerns, they 
face two major issues.  On the one hand, psychiatrists are greatly 




130 See id. at 259 (stating that “[j]udges continue to defer, almost blindly, to expert testi-
mony”). 
131 See Jones, 463 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Project Release, 722 F.2d 
at 973 (acknowledging that “the medical profession’s ability to predict dangerousness . . . is 
hotly debated”). 
132 See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 41-42 (1999) (providing that “[i]n practice, commitment 
hearings tend to be brief and non-adversarial episodes in which judges appear to ‘rubber 
stamp’ the recommendations of clinical expert witnesses.  Indeed, studies show judicial 
agreement with expert witnesses in this area ranges from seventy-nine to one hundred per-
cent, and most frequently exceeds ninety-five percent.”). 
17
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free.133  This concern dictates their desire to err on the side of caution 
and commit non-dangerous individuals.134 
On the other hand, psychiatrists rarely face any liability for 
confining non-dangerous individuals because very few wrongfully 
confined individuals challenge their commitments.135  The brave 
“[i]nmates of mental institutions”136 who attempt to challenge their 
wrongful civil commitments quickly learn that the existing legal 
standards, under which their claims are reviewed, are one-sided and 
overly protective of the mental health professionals acting on behalf 
of the state, rather than of those who suffered liberty deprivations.137  
While the presently employed standards ensure that it would be diffi-
cult for the plaintiff to prevail,138 they fail to incorporate the constitu-




133 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 275 (stating that “[t]he psychiatrist who fails to accurately 
assess a dangerous patient and authorizes the release or suggests a court release a mentally ill 
individual who subsequently engages in harm-causing behavior will be subject to severe crit-
icism”). 
134 Id.  Brooks explains that: 
[A] concern for liability can impact a clinician’s decision-making in the 
commitment context because it can create a conflict with the goal of 
committing only those individuals who, after a careful assessment and 
application of clinically appropriate criteria, meet the commitment 
standard.  When this occurs, clinicians err on the side of protection from 
liability. 
Id. 
135 Id. at 275-76.  For example:  
[I]f the psychiatrist incorrectly assesses a nondangerous individual as 
dangerous, he will suffer no consequences.  The psychiatrist’s assess-
ment of likely harm-causing behavior cannot be challenged because no 
one knows whether harm would have occurred if the doctor did not au-
thorize coercive clinical intervention.  Thus, both the public and the 
committing psychiatrist will rarely, if ever, learn about an incorrect as-
sessment of dangerousness, but they will always learn about an incorrect 
assessment of nondangerousness. 
Id. 
136 Jones, 463 U.S. at 384. 
137 See Simon, supra note 118, at 298 (acknowledging psychiatrists’ understanding of lack 
of liability for wrongful civil commitment so long as it was a good faith mistake). 
138 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 16, at 559 (urging that “[a]n examination of Lewis and 
its progeny demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s adoption of the shocks-the-conscience 
standard for substantive due process violations has imposed a nearly insurmountable obsta-
cle to holding government officials responsible for their abuses of power”). 
18
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III. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW EVOLUTION OF TWO 
COMPETING STANDARDS UTILIZED IN THE IMPOSITION OF 
LIABILITY ON STATE ACTORS FOR WRONGFUL CIVIL 
COMMITMENTS 
Currently, there are only four circuits139 that have decided 
what standard should govern the imposition of liability on psychia-
trists, acting on behalf of the state, in challenges to wrongful civil 
commitments.  These circuits are split on the issue of which standard 
should prevail.140  This disagreement does not involve their shared 
failure to incorporate the O’Connor requirements into their standards. 
A. The Third and Tenth Circuits 
The Third and the Tenth Circuits adopted the “shocks-the-
conscience” standard, a standard that was announced by the Supreme 
Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.141  Under this Lewis stand-
ard, a psychiatrist would be liable for wrongful civil commitment on-
ly if his or her decision to commit shocked-the-conscience.142  There 
are several important aspects of Lewis that need to be clarified. 
First, Lewis did not involve a challenge to one’s civil con-
finement.143  Rather, Lewis involved the establishment of a “standard 
of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating 
substantive due process in a pursuit case.”144  The case stemmed from 
a high-speed police pursuit of two teenagers on a motorcycle that re-
sulted in the death of one of the youths.145  The parents of the de-
ceased boy brought a lawsuit claiming that the police officers violat-
 
139 See Benn, 371 F.3d 165; Bolmer, 594 F.3d 134; Jensen, 312 F.3d 1145; Rodriguez, 72 
F.3d 1051; Obado, 524 F. App'x 812; James, 1998 WL 664315, at *1 (representing the Sec-
ond, Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, respectively). 
140 Compare Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063 (imposing liability on state psychiatrists for 
wrongful civil commitments only if the committing mental health professional’s decision to 
confine was made on the basis that is “substantially below the standards generally accepted 
in the medical community”), Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 143 (same), and Jensen, 312 F.3d at 1147 
(same), with Benn, 371 F.3d at 174 (imposing liability on state psychiatrists only if their de-
cision to commit, under the circumstances, “shocks the conscience”), Obado, 524 F. App'x 
at 815 (same), and James, 1998 WL 664315, at *7 (same). 
141 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
142 See Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; Obado, 524 F. App'x at 815; James, 1998 WL 664315, at 
*7. 
143 See Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
144 Id. at 839. 
145 Id. at 836-37. 
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ed their son’s Fourteenth Amendment right to life.146 
The district court granted summary judgment for the police 
officer on the theory of qualified immunity.147  The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed and established that “the appropriate 
degree of fault to be applied to high-speed police pursuits is deliber-
ate indifference to, or reckless disregard for, a person’s right to life 
and personal security.”148  In rejecting the standard established by the 
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court announced that the only “level of 
executive abuse of power” that violates substantive due process rights 
is one that “shocks the conscience.”149  Furthermore, the Court de-
clared, “only the most egregious executive action can be said to be 
‘arbitrary’ in the constitutional sense.”150 
Second, it is vital to understand the significance of Lewis.  
Lewis did not merely establish a new standard—it went beyond 
that.151  It created an entire framework for analyzing imposition of li-
ability for the State’s wrongful conduct.152  It provided that “[t]he 
conscience-shocking concept points clearly away from liability, or 
clearly toward it, only at the ends of the tort law’s culpability spec-
trum.”153  To demonstrate this, the Court held that mere negligence 
on the part of the State does not shock the conscience and does not 
trigger the imposition of liability.154 
However, when the state official’s conduct stems from the 
middle range of the culpability spectrum, such as recklessness or 
gross negligence, the Supreme Court held that such conduct requires 
a more careful investigation.155  The Court provided for a possibility 
 
146 Id. at 837. 
147 Id. at 837-38. 
148 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 838 (quoting Sacramento Cnty. v. Lewis, 98 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
149 Id. at 846. 
150 Id. at 834. 
151 See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 142 (explaining that “[t]he Court indicated . . . that the shocks-
the-conscience inquiry is not a stand-alone test for determining whether particular executive 
conduct violates substantive due process; rather, it provides a framework for making such a 
determination”). 
152 Id. 
153 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 834. 
154 Id. (providing that “[l]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the 
constitutional due process threshold”). 
155 Id. at 849 (providing that “[w]hether the point of the conscience shocking is reached 
when injuries are produced with culpability falling within the middle range, following from 
something more than negligence but ‘less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 
gross negligence,’ is a matter for closer calls”). 
20
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of imposition of liability156 and emphasized that “some official acts in 
this range may be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment.”157  
The Court explained that “[r]ules of due process are not . . . subject to 
mechanical application”158 because “[d]eliberate indifference that 
shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in an-
other.”159  To determine whether liability is to follow, the Court 
called for “an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse of 
power is condemned as conscience shocking.”160 
When it comes to intentional conduct on the part of state offi-
cials, the Court held that “conduct deliberately intended to injure . . . 
is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-
shocking level.”161  Civil commitment involves intent in its clearest 
form.162  For example, the court in Demarco v. Sadiker163 acknowl-
edged that liberty deprivation through civil commitment is “the result 
of a[n] . . . intentional act of confinement.”164  Thus, pursuant to Lew-
is, an intentional act of civil commitment that lacked a constitutional 
basis of mental illness and dangerousness would result in the imposi-
tion of liability.  Unfortunately, the courts which adopted the standard 
are yet to conform to this analysis. 
For instance, in 2004, in Benn v. Universal Health System, 
Inc.,165 the Third Circuit addressed the issue of the governing stand-
ard in actions for liability resulting from wrongful civil commit-
ments.166  Donald Benn brought an action against those involved in 
his short-term involuntary confinement.167  Among several allega-




158 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 834. 
162 See, e.g., Demarco v. Sadiker, 897 F. Supp. 693, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that 
“where . . . a plaintiff alleges that he was intentionally committed to a mental hospital with-
out the requisite finding of dangerousness and/or without his actually being dangerous, he 
has sufficiently plead the mens rea requirement of a § 1983 cause of action based upon a due 
process violation”). 
163 897 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
164 Id. at 700. 
165 371 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2004). 
166 Id. at 174. 
167 Id. at 167. 
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lowed a “seriously defective evaluative process,”168 which led them 
to conclude that Benn met the criteria for emergency confinement.169  
On appeal from summary judgment granted to the defendants, the 
Third Circuit provided that “[i]n a due process challenge to executive 
action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the govern-
mental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be 
said to shock the contemporary conscience.”170 
In adopting the Lewis approach, the Third Circuit also ex-
pressed that “whether or not . . . [the psychiatrists] properly analyzed 
Benn’s condition, their conduct did not violate substantive due pro-
cess.”171  In other words, the court held that regardless of a possible 
inaccuracy of the psychiatrists’ determination of Benn’s dangerous-
ness, the order to commit a non-dangerous or non-mentally ill patient 
did not shock the conscience.172  This conclusion again avoids consti-
tutional protections afforded to the mentally ill by O’Connor.  In 
2013, the Third Circuit, in Obado v. UMDNJ, Behavioral Health 
Center,173 reaffirmed that “the appropriate test for assessing liability 
in the context of involuntary commitment decisions is the ‘shocks the 
conscience’ standard announced in Lewis.”174  Similar to the court in 
Benn, the court in Obado did not find the psychiatrists’ intentional act 
of commitment conscience-shocking.175 
In 1998, the Tenth Circuit also adopted the Lewis standard.176  
In James v. Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc.,177 Jeannie James 
brought an action against nine defendants for her wrongful civil 
commitment.178  The district court dismissed all of her claims.179  The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the al-
leged conduct by the defendants did not rise to the level of con-
science shocking and, thus, did not violate James’s substantive due 
 
168 Id. at 172. 
169 Id. 
170 Benn, 371 F.3d at 174 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847). 
171 Id. at 175. 
172 Id. 
173 524 Fed. App’x. 812 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 986 (2014). 
174 Id. at 815. 
175 Id. 
176 See James, 1998 WL 664315, at *7 (holding that plaintiff’s “allegations would not rise 
to the “shocks the conscience” standard articulated by the Supreme Court for substantive due 
process claims”). 
177 No. 97-5157, 1998 WL 664315 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998). 
178 Id. at *1. 
179 Id. at *2. 
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss1/12
2014 O’CONNOR’S DANGEROUSNESS REQUIREMENT 171 
process rights.180  Unfortunately, this circuit also failed to incorporate 
the O’Connor requirements of mental illness and dangerousness, thus 
failing to provide protections to non-dangerous individuals. 
B. The Second and Ninth Circuits 
The Second Circuit was the first to decide what standard 
should govern when imposing liability on state psychiatrists for 
wrongful civil commitments.  This court was also the first to depart 
from O’Connor’s dangerousness analysis.  Instead, the court adopted 
a standard that heavily resembles the standard announced by the Su-
preme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo181 in 1982.182  As a result, in 
1995, the Second Circuit, in Rodriguez v. City of New York,183 estab-
lished that only where the psychiatrist’s commitment decision is 
based on criteria that are “substantially below the standards generally 
accepted in the medical community,” or, in other words, the decision 
to commit was grossly negligent, will liability follow.184 
In 1993, Florangel Rodriguez commenced an action challeng-
ing her emergency, involuntary, short-term civil confinement, when 
the evaluating psychiatrists concluded that “[s]he . . . [was] a poten-
tial danger to herself and would benefit from hospitalization.”185  Ro-
driguez vigorously contested these clinical conclusions, alleging that 
 
180 Id. at *7. 
181 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
182 In Youngberg, the Court explored the substantive due process rights of institutionalized 
patients within an institution and state actions that violated those rights.  Id. at 309.  Nicholas 
Romeo, while permanently committed to a state institution, allegedly sustained injuries on at 
least sixty-three occasions, during the duration of his civil commitment.  Id. at 310.  His 
mother brought a suit challenging the conditions of his confinement.  Id.  The Court empha-
sized that Romeo “does not challenge the commitment” and “neither respondent nor his fam-
ily seeks his discharge from state care.”  Id. at 315, 329.  Rather, they alleged that Romeo 
had a substantive due process right to safety, freedom of movement, and training within the 
institution.  Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.  They further alleged that these rights were violated 
by the officials’ failure to meet such constitutional requirements of civil commitment.  Id.  
The Supreme Court established that one’s “liberty interests require the State to provide min-
imally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.”  
Id. at 319.  However, “liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional 
is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as 
to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judg-
ment.”  Id. at 323. 
183 72 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 1995). 
184 See id. at 1063 (finding that “whether an individual is to be summarily deprived of her 
liberty—be exercised on the basis of substantive and procedural criteria that are not substan-
tially below the standards generally accepted in the medical community”). 
185 Id. at 1055. 
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the medical entries by the examining psychiatrists “in many respects 
inaccurately or incompletely depicted the statements made by Rodri-
guez”186 and that the psychiatrists “took Rodriguez’s statements out 
of context.”187  She further contested the durations of her examina-
tions and the manner in which they were conducted.188  Lastly, plain-
tiff provided competing clinical findings and testimony by an inde-
pendent psychiatrist who concluded that the examination by the 
committing mental health professionals was full of “glaring er-
rors.”189  Such errors ranged from examining Rodriguez for suicidal 
risk for an insufficient amount of time to failing to inquire into the 
truthfulness of some of the statements that she allegedly made.190 
The trial court granted summary judgment to the state defend-
ants.191  On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the trial court’s deci-
sion and remanded the case.192  To guide lower courts in similar pro-
ceedings, the court declared that a physician’s “judgment—affecting 
whether an individual is to be summarily deprived of her liberty—be 
exercised on the basis of substantive and procedural criteria that are 
not substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medi-
cal community.  Due process requires no less.”193 
Fifteen years later, in 2010, the Second Circuit had an oppor-
tunity to revisit Rodriguez.  In Bolmer v. Oliveira,194 the court reaf-
firmed that “an involuntary commitment violates substantive due 
process if the decision to commit is made on the basis of ‘substantive 
and procedural criteria that are . . . substantially below the standards 
generally accepted in the medical community.’ ”195  Bolmer was 
committed on an involuntary and emergency basis following his 
evaluation that lasted somewhere between five and fifteen196 minutes 
by the psychiatrist who was never previously involved in his care.197 
Brett Bolmer alleged sexual involvement with his case man-
 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1056. 
188 Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1055-56. 
189 Id. at 1056. 
190 Id. at 1056-57. 
191 Id. at 1053. 
192 Id. at 1066. 
193 Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063. 
194 594 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2010). 
195 Id. at 139 (citing Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063). 
196 Id. at 138. 
197 Id. 
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ager, who he had known personally, prior to the beginning of their 
professional relationship.198  The treatment team did not believe the 
allegations199 and attributed them to Bolmer’s manifestation of “ero-
tomania,”200 a form of delusion.  Bolmer’s psychiatric evaluation fol-
lowed and, as a result, he was transported to a hospital where he was 
strapped to the bed and administered anti-psychotic medication.201  
When the hospital staff discovered numerous text messages between 
Bolmer and his case manager and confirmed the existence of com-
munication between the two, Brett Bolmer was discharged.202  He 
brought a lawsuit alleging a violation of his substantive due process 
rights.203 
The defense argued that Rodriguez did not govern the issue 
because it was decided in 1995, prior to Lewis.204  Rather, the defense 
argued that Lewis, decided by the Supreme Court three years after 
Rodriguez, should become the principal standard.  The Second Cir-
cuit in Bolmer was faced with the task of reconciling the two stand-
ards.205 
The court responded to the defense’s argument for adoption 
of Lewis by declaring that “the shocks-the-conscience inquiry is not a 
stand-alone test for determining whether particular executive conduct 
violates substantive due process.”206  Rather, such determination 
should be based on specific surrounding context.207  The Second Cir-
cuit held that the decision of a physician “to involuntarily commit a 
mentally ill person because he poses a danger to himself or others 
shocks the conscience, thereby violating substantive due process, 
when the decision is based on ‘substantive and procedural criteria 
that are . . . substantially below the standards generally accepted in 
 
198 Id. at 137. 
199 Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 137-38. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 138. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 139. 
204 See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 137 (“Oliveira argues that the medical-standards test . . . is 
inconsistent with [Lewis]” because “it imposes liability for conduct that does not ‘shock the 
conscience.’ ”). 
205 See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 143 (addressing Oliveira’s contention that “the district court 
erred by applying Rodriguez’s medical-standards test instead of determining whether 
Oliveira’s conduct shocked the conscience under Lewis”). 
206 Id. at 142. 
207 Id. at 142-43. 
25
Walker: O'Connor's Dangerous Requirement
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
174 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
the medical community.’ ”208  Therefore, since Rodriguez imposes li-
ability for the conduct that, at a minimum, can be classified as grossly 
negligent209 and Lewis does not preclude liability for such a middle-
range culpability level,210 the court found that “Rodriguez is con-
sistent with Lewis.”211 
In adhering to the standard that essentially resembles Young-
berg, another Supreme Court decision that will be discussed later, the 
Second Circuit departed from what O’Connor urged the courts to do, 
namely, to analyze whether or not the individual who allegedly suf-
fered a deprivation of liberty was mentally ill and dangerous at the 
time of his or her commitment.212  Instead, the court implemented a 
standard that would inquire whether the decision to commit was 
made on the basis that is “substantially below the standards generally 
accepted in the medical community[,]” or, in other words, whether 
the psychiatrist’s level of culpability reached the required level of 
gross negligence for liability to follow.213  Similar to the Second Cir-
cuit, in 2002, the Ninth Circuit in Jensen v. Lane County214 also 
adopted the standard announced in Rodriguez.215 
C. Reasons for Incorporating O’Connor’s 
Dangerousness Requirement into the Two Existing 
Legal Standards. 
There are several reasons why federal courts should incorpo-
rate O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement into their existing legal 
standards.  First, the two Supreme Court decisions, Lewis and Young-
berg, which constitute bases for currently employed standards, are 
not quite on point nor are they relevant to wrongful commitment 
challenges.  For example, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ standard of 
“substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical 
community,” or in other words, a gross negligence standard, resem-
bles the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Youngberg.216  
 
208 Id. at 143 (quoting Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063). 
209 Id. at 144. 
210 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. 
211 Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 137. 
212 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576. 
213 Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063. 
214 312 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2002). 
215 Id. at 1147. 
216 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063; Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 143; Jensen, 312 F.3d at 
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The plaintiff in Youngberg did not challenge his confinement.217  Ra-
ther, he challenged conditions of his confinement.218  Therefore, a 
gross negligence standard is more appropriate in challenges to con-
finement conditions, such as right to treatment.  In other words, the 
government should not be held to the same standard when it provides 
something, such as institutional care, as when it takes something 
away.  This especially holds true when what the government is taking 
away involves a fundamental right. 
The Lewis “shocks-the-conscience” standard, adopted by the 
Third and the Tenth Circuits, resulted from the case in which the de-
fendant police officers had “no intent to harm suspects physically or 
to worsen their legal plight.”219  Unlike the police officers in Lewis 
who unintentionally engaged in a deadly chase, psychiatrists always 




217 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 (emphasizing that the plaintiff did “not challenge the 
commitment”); see id. at 329 (Burger, J., concurring) (reiterating that the plaintiff did not 
seek “his discharge from state care”). 
218 Id. at 315 (explaining that the plaintiff-respondent  “argues that he has a constitutional-
ly protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training within the institu-
tion; and that petitioners infringed these rights by failing to provide constitutionally required 
conditions of confinement”). 
219 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854 (emphasis added). 
220 See, e.g., Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 699.  Plaintiff argued that the act of confinement 
was intentional because “it was defendants' decision to act on their belief that plaintiff was 
dangerous, rather than the belief itself, that deprived him of his liberty.”  Id.  The defendant 
did not dispute that “every involuntary confinement under the mental hygiene statute is a 
deliberate act.”  Id.  The court agreed that “[t]he alleged deprivation of plaintiff's liberty in 
the case at bar was the result of a[n] . . . intentional act of confinement.”  Id. at 700.  See also 
Plain v. Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898, 904 n.4 (D.N.J. 1986) (“Since the examiner is the initial 
decisionmaker it raises the question whether a psychiatrist might have an incentive to com-
mit for the week prior to the judicial hearing.  This ‘puts the psychiatrist in the self-
aggrandizing position of being able to recruit one's own involuntary clients.’ ”). 
221 See Jones, 463 U.S. at 379 (emphasizing that “strong institutional biases lead . . . [psy-
chiatrists] to err when they attempt to determine an individual's dangerousness, especially 
when the consequence of a finding of dangerousness is that an obviously mentally ill patient 
will remain within their control”); see also James, 1998 WL 664315, at *2 (concerning an 
allegation that some civil commitments take place to satisfy doctors’ “sadistic desires . . . to 
make an example to others”); see also Brooks, supra note 6, at 265-66 (discussing numerous 
reasons that lie behind psychiatrists’ intent to commit, including psychiatrists’ lack of ability 
to properly assess for dangerousness that leads them to err on the side of caution and over-
commit; psychiatrists’ strong support of providing institutionalized treatment regardless of 
the dangerousness status of an individual; psychiatrists’ belief that the former “need for 
treatment” requirement is the proper standard; as well as psychiatrists’ fear of liability for 
releasing an individual, who is, in fact, dangerous into society). 
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The second reason federal courts should incorporate 
O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement into their existing legal 
standards is because the adoption of the presently utilized standards 
marked the establishment of another pro-psychiatrist era in the law.  
Prior to Rodriguez, the Second Circuit inquired as to “whether it was 
objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe, at the time they 
examined [the mentally ill patient] and in light of the information that 
they possessed, that [the patient] was dangerous.”222  After Rodri-
guez, the issue became whether the decision to commit was made on 
the basis of “substantive and procedural criteria that are not substan-
tially below the standards generally accepted in the medical commu-
nity” or, in other words, whether the decision to commit was grossly 
negligent.223 
Rodriguez did not merely change the legal standard; it partial-
ly contradicted O’Connor.  The Court in O’Connor would support 
the proposition that it is vital for psychiatrists to “make not just an as-
sessment, but the correct assessment”224 and any “state official who 
intentionally confines a person who is a danger neither to himself nor 
others would be liable for damages.”225  However, the Second Circuit 
disagreed.226  It declared in Rodriguez that “due process does not re-
quire a guarantee that a physician’s assessment of the likelihood of 
serious harm be correct”227 and it does not expect committing physi-
cians to be “omniscient” in their decisions.228  All due process re-
quires is that the decision be “made in accordance with a standard 
that promises some reasonable degree of accuracy.”229  While the 
court recognized that “[e]rroneous commitments . . . implicate the in-
dividual’s interest in liberty,”230 it held that so long as other psychia-
trists would make the same mistaken conclusion about one’s danger-
ousness, the state actors would not be liable for wrongful civil 
commitment.231  This holding contradicts Jones, where the Supreme 
Court provided that “the Government has a strong interest in accu-
 
222 Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993). 
223 Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063. 
224 Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 702. 
225 Id. at 700. 
226 Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1062. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 1063. 
229 Id. at 1062. 
230 Id. at 1061-62 (quoting Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
231 Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063, 1065. 
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rate, efficient commitment decisions.”232  In allowing committing 
psychiatrists to make incorrect conclusions, so long as these determi-
nations are “not substantially below the standards generally accepted 
in the medical community,”233 the Second Circuit would find no sub-
stantive due process violation in commitments of individuals who 
pose no danger to themselves or others.234  Therefore, the Second 
Circuit’s logic violates O’Connor, which allows civil confinement 
only if an individual is both mentally ill and dangerous.235 
When applying the shocks-the-conscience standard, in theory, 
the court would impose liability for wrongful civil commitment be-
cause Lewis clearly declared that “conduct deliberately intended to 
injure . . . is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the con-
science-shocking level.”236  Every commitment is an intentional 
act.237  Unfortunately, in practice, the law is not so efficient and the 
courts that adhere to this standard have yet to find any psychiatrist’s 
decision to commit, even a non-dangerous individual, conscience-
shocking.238  To rectify this injustice, the jurisdictions that adopted 
the conscience-shocking standard should first decide the factual issue 
of whether the individual was dangerous at the time of his or her con-
finement.  Only if the factfinder concludes the individual was not, in 
fact, dangerous, should the court proceed to the issue of whether the 
psychiatrist’s decision to commit the non-dangerous individual was 
conscience-shocking.  Thus, the incorporation of O’Connor’s dan-
gerousness requirement would balance the constitutional protections 
afforded to the mentally ill and protections afforded to state psychia-
trists under the rigid shocks-the-conscience standard. 
 
232 Jones, 463 U.S. at 377. 
233 Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063. 
234 Id. 
235 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576. 
236 Lewis, 523 U.S. 834. 
237 See Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 699 (“[T]he intentional act of keeping plaintiff in admin-
istrative custody provided sufficient state of mind to state a § 1983 action, regardless wheth-
er the failure to provide due process was without fault.”) (citing Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 
F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
238 See, e.g., Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; Obado, 524 F. App'x at 815; James, 1998 WL 
664315, at *7. 
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Civil commitment exists to provide a high level of supervised 
psychiatric care for individuals who are so severely affected by men-
tal illness that community-based services can no longer support and 
maintain their psychiatric stability.  When such instability causes er-
ratic behaviors that put the mentally ill or third parties in danger, civil 
commitment is an appropriate remedy.239  At first glance, it may 
sound like a straightforward concept.  However, it is not. 
History of civil commitments can help in understanding the 
issue.  From the commencement of civil commitment practice until 
the mid-twentieth century, psychiatrists had the sole extensive and 
unrestricted power to determine an individual’s “need for treat-
ment.”240  Those deemed to be in need of treatment were civilly con-
fined, often for many years.241  To determine whether or not one was 
in need of treatment, psychiatrists relied on their clinical judg-
ments.242  Lack of any legal requirement to support such clinical 
judgments often led to abuses of power.243  An era of new research in 
the field of psychiatry, development of new anti-psychotic medica-
tions, and a rebirth of the civil rights movement revealed concerns of 
abuse and arbitrariness that, at times, stood behind psychiatrists’ clin-
ical judgments.244 
In 1975, the Supreme Court acknowledged these concerns and 
proclaimed that only those mentally ill individuals who pose a danger 
to self or others can be civilly committed.245  The foundational inten-
tion behind the dual requirement was to restrict the power of psychia-
trists to confine by providing more objective criteria.246  The courts 
were to inquire into the soundness of psychiatrists’ determinations 
and to make the final decision.247  These safeguards were placed to 
protect constitutional rights of the mentally ill.  However, soon it be-
 
239 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. 
240 See Appelbaum, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
241 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
242 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
245 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. 
246 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 262-63. 
247 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 263. 
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came evident that the dangerousness standard was not without its lim-
itations. 
For example, while there is no doubt that psychiatrists can di-
agnose mental illness within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
it soon became clear that the same cannot be said for their ability to 
predict dangerousness.248  Studies revealed that for several reasons, 
psychiatrists extensively overpredict when determining whether a 
person is dangerous.249  First, the concept of danger is vague.250  Ju-
risdictions across the country fail to provide precise definitions that 
would incorporate all aspects of danger and disagree about what it 
entails.251  This failure allows psychiatrists to craft their own subjec-
tive understanding of what dangerousness incorporates and fit the re-
ported symptoms into those personalized definitions.252  Second, 
mental health professionals often rely on their clinical judgments ra-
ther than on actuarial methods of prediction when assessing danger-
ousness.253  In practice, this means that judges have no way of testing 
psychiatrists’ assessment conclusions, because these conclusions are 
based solely on psychiatrists’ professional experience.  Third, regard-
less of the courts’ awareness about psychiatrists’ lack of proficiency 
in detecting dangerousness, courts still heavily defer to psychiatrists’ 
expert testimony during commitment hearings.254  Fourth, mental 
health professionals fear liability if they fail to confine a dangerous 
mentally ill person.255  On the other hand, they rarely face liability if 
they confine a non-dangerous mentally ill person.256  The rare chal-
lenges to wrongful civil confinements face very pro-psychiatrist legal 
 
248 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
249 Id. 
250 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
251 See, e.g., Stevens, 761 P.2d at 772-73 nn.4-7; see also supra note 119. 
252 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
253 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 272: 
[O]nly a minority, and maybe a small minority, of mental health profes-
sionals employ structured risk assessment techniques . . . despite ad-
vances in knowledge about the risk of violence by people with mental 
illness, there have been virtually no . . . efforts to incorporate the infor-
mation into a useful, empirically-based framework for clinical assess-
ment. 
Id. 
254 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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standards that govern imposition of liability.257 
Currently, the circuits are split on the appropriate standard to 
determine whether liability should be imposed on a state psychiatrist 
for a wrongful civil commitment.  The Second and Ninth Circuits on-
ly impose liability if the decision to confine a mentally ill person, re-
gardless of whether he or she was in fact dangerous at the time of civ-
il commitment, was based on judgment that is “substantially below 
the standards generally accepted in the medical community.”258  
There is no requirement for psychiatrists to be correct in their judg-
ments at all.259  Therefore, so long as other psychiatrists would also 
wrongfully confine, liability does not follow.  The Third and Tenth 
Circuits impose liability on psychiatrists only if the decision to com-
mit a mentally ill individual, dangerous or not, “shocks the con-
science.”260 
Neither one of the adopted standards takes into account the 
constitutional protections imposed by the Supreme Court in 
O’Connor.261  Under O’Connor, the only way a mentally ill person 
can be constitutionally deprived of his or her liberty is if he or she 
poses a threat to self or others.262  Thus, courts fail to recognize that 
as soon as a psychiatrist makes an erroneous decision to confine a 
non-dangerous mentally ill person, the wrongfully civilly confined 
individual is being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment 
right to liberty, and liability should follow. 
To reconcile the discrepancy in protections afforded by the 
courts to mental health professionals and the mentally ill, the courts 
should incorporate O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement into their 
current standards.  To avoid further manipulations of the concept of 
dangerousness, states and courts should define what this concept in-
volves.  Psychiatrists should be required to utilize reliable methods of 
dangerousness prediction.  Courts should consider utilizing inde-
pendent expert testimony at trial to test committing psychiatrists’ 
conclusions.  Lastly, legal professionals who represent mentally ill 
individuals should demonstrate the utmost level of advocacy during 
 
257 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
258 Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063. 
259 Id. at 1062. 
260 See Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; Obado, 524 F. App'x at 815; James, 1998 WL 664315, at 
*7. 
261 See Benn, 371 F.3d 165; Bolmer, 594 F.3d 134; Jensen, 312 F.3d 1145; Rodriguez, 72 
F.3d 1051; Obado, 524 F. App'x 812; James, 1998 WL 664315, at *1. 
262 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. 
32
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss1/12
2014 O’CONNOR’S DANGEROUSNESS REQUIREMENT 181 
commitment hearings to prevent wrongful civil confinements.  They 
should remember that strong legal representation might be the only 
hope that people affected by mental illness have.  By securing all 
these safeguards, the law will be able to provide mentally ill individ-
uals with the level of protection the Fourteenth Amendment requires. 
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